False memories are representations of events that have been fabricated from post-event suggestions, semantic associations, intrusions from related sources, confusions of sources or social beliefs. False memories are not lies or pathological dysfunctions, but new events. They can also be memories of previous events that really happened and that have been transformed. Several experimental paradigms have been developed to better understand the cognitive processes involved in the creation of false memories. In this study, we use the DRM paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) which is based on word lists. The title of a list is considered as a critical lure. Although the title is not presented to the participant, the participant will recall it as part of the original list. The explanation of false memories is based on the implicit activation-monitoring theory (Roediger et al., 2001). This one is based on the activation of a semantic concept in memory, which propagates to other semantic concepts associated with it (Collins & Loftus, 1975). At the time of encoding, the words in the list will activate the critical lure that will be recalled by the participant. This is called a false memory. Implicit activation-monitoring is also based on source control theory (Johnson & Raye, 1998). Individuals make false memories because they fail to distinguish information perceived in their environment from information generated in memory.
This present study focuses on two encoding strategies on false memory reduction: the enactment effect and motor imagery. The enactment refers to the performance of an act and more precisely, the simulation by mime or the actual performance of a motor act. Visual imagery is a mental representation constructed by the individual through his or her stock of knowledge about the world. Imagery activity is characterized by the representation of an object that is not present in our environment at the time we mention it. In this study, we use the participant’s motor imagery. This refers to their ability to mentally feel movements and sensations associated with the performance of actions. These two activities have been explored independently using the DRM to determine their involvement in the occurrence of false memories.
This study proposes to compare these strategies and supposes that they will reduce the occurrence of false memories and promote correct recognition. To do this, 83 adults aged 18 to 41 years were recruited and divided into three groups: action, imagery and control. They performed an adapted DRM task with action sentences. Their performance was assessed using a recognition test and the Remember/Know paradigm (Tulving,1985) which measures the level of certainty that accompanied recognition.
Results do not allow us to validate our hypotheses as the false recognition. Also, correct recognition rates did not show significant differences between the three conditions.
First, to explain these findings, neuroimaging studies show that motor execution and motor imagination activate common brain areas in the motor cortex (Hétu et al., 2013). Second, these findings support the theory of embodied cognition (Robin & Garnier, 2021). According to this theory, a memory will be translate into a mental simulation. Simulation consists in simulating written or oral verbal language, by constructing a mental representation, of an object or situation. Encoded events form sensory-motor traces that are common and increase their probability of being confused with previous events. Specifically, knowledge in memory is the result of a coupling between sensory, motor, emotional, and motivational properties of situations (Act-In Model, Versace et al, 2014).
To conclude, the identical performance between the encoding conditions and the presence of false memories can be explained by the fact that the participants automatically simulated the actions.
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